Today we will talk about how, in which countries, programs to reduce the birth rate were operating, what results this led to.
“Population control (including the Birth Control Policy) is the practice of artificially changing the growth rate of human populations. Historically, population control has been implemented through birth control, usually by the government, in response to various factors, including high or growing poverty, environmental restrictions, overpopulation, or for religious reasons. ”
The information that the population of the Earth will soon exceed 8 billion people will not be news to anyone, while the optimal number of people who can peacefully coexist on Earth without interfering with each other, without adversely affecting the environment (and then relatively ) - only about 6 billion. Still, for any values of the population, at least 1 billion people will have a bad effect on the Earth.
But even before the population of the Earth had already begun to approach a critical level in terms of numbers, some countries had long crossed the line of maximum possible accommodation of citizens on their territory. These countries are:
China, India, Singapore, Iran.
We will tell you in turn how the policy of restricting the birth rate was applied in them.
China
“The most widely controlled population is modern China. Basically, each family is allowed to have no more than one child here, although there are exceptions. Violation of the restrictions results in fines.
The One Family, One Child program was launched in 1978. According to official statistics, the program has helped prevent over 400 million births. The success of the program is sometimes called into question, as part of the decline in fertility is due to the country's industrialization and economic factors.
Since 2016, the program has been canceled and a permit for the establishment of two children has been introduced. "
At the moment, China (India is not far away, as well as the mainland of Africa) is the country with the largest population in the world, while the country is the third largest territory in the world, but there is not enough space for everyone. The population density is over 143.7 people / km².
Attempts to somehow lead China to prudent childbirth began in the middle of the last century, the One Family - One Child program was launched in the 1970s. If at the beginning of its use per woman there were on average 5.8 children, today it is 1.8. Here it is worth taking into account the growth of the population, respectively, the expansion of the proportions of growth.
Even during the period of the program, there were exceptional cases when parents were allowed to have two children, for example, national minorities, villagers, spouses who were the only children in their families, in cases of multiple pregnancies and if the first child is a girl or with defects, the state could also show loyalty.
The Chinese, especially those living in the countryside, often lied when compiling the census about the number of children (so that they would not be subject to birth control sanctions and to hide the number of children already existing), thus the data that we see today is perhaps greatly underestimated. In fact, even today, despite the lifting of cardinal restrictions, birth control in China exists.
What are the official-decent measures taken to limit the birth rate? The marriageable age was raised, for girls it was 20 years old, for boys it was 22 years old, before marriage, potential parents had to undergo medical examinations and examinations (by a psychiatrist, a narcologist, etc.), the prestige of education was increased, extramarital and premarital relations were condemned. Illegal and cruel methods of reducing the birth rate include forced abortion and sterilization, the killing of babies, in particular of the female sex, but about these measures a little later.
Of course, many are worried about the question - how did the Chinese manage to increase in numbers so quickly? What's the secret to fertility? Possibly in a scorpion tincture, commonly consumed since the ancient imperial dynasties throughout China, possibly in early puberty and high fertility in women. Another point concerning all countries with a high birth rate and a growing population is poverty, the inaccessibility of primitive contraceptive measures. Here the situation turns, let's say roughly, not into quality, but into quantity. There are a lot of people, but there is nothing to give them, nothing to occupy, so the new generation is mainly engaged in making children early.
However, in the case of China, this is controversial - so many innovations, albeit cheap, harmful, disposable, are not brought to us by any other country.
What harsh measures were used against those who violated the framework of the One Family, One Child program? Fines were mainly imposed on local authorities. when, as a result of the census, it was established that there are more children in the family than it should be. Fines amounted to several annual salaries, in connection with which the authorities at the local level were forced to actively fight against fertility by cruel methods. For example, women were forcibly sterilized, aborted for a long time. Infants were often sent to soup, a well-known practice.
Girls were not considered human at all, there were cases of non-provision of medical care to female children, who subsequently died due to the negligence of doctors. Parents and Chinese citizens themselves often treated girls as second-class people. It was possible to have an abortion for a long time without evidence if the sex of the female child was established.
What did all this lead to? Not only the disorderly birth rate, because it is a consequence of certain processes, but also such a devaluation of human life in the form of a cruel framework for the implementation of the program to reduce the birth rate.
To the fact that the life of a person in China has become equal to zero ...
There are so many Chinese that they do not pity themselves, they do not pity their own kind. And it's wild.
The first country in the world in terms of the number of death sentences (that is, here not only abortions for a long time are legalized as measures of population control, but also the murder of the adult population for various reasons), a country where soups with babies are eaten, and this is not prohibited by law. where sex change, prostitution (young boys, girls), homosexuality, where the life of girls is often equal to the life of an insect is the norm.
India
The population of India today is almost the same as in China - more than 1.3 billion people (second place in the world), territory - 7th in the world, population density - 364 people / km².
Despite the fact that India is a superpower with nuclear weapons, despite the fact that the country has a well-developed education sector - the percentage of the poor is too high, the overwhelming majority of the population is below the poverty line by European standards.
Naturally, poverty entails the inability to access contraception, development, and getting a normal job. If you watch films about Indians who live in the very wilderness of poor areas, you will understand that things are not so bad in our country.
Sometimes people just sleep on cardboard, wash in puddles, eat fish caught in a waste ditch, give birth to 7-8 children, without even noticing the appearance of a new family member. And it’s a pity for such people, they have never known another life, but they do not want to live alone, they want some kind of family ... everything that they saw from their parents is the same reproduction in poverty ...
There are more "prosperous" Indians, for example, living in slums, villages, independently built. There are comparatively wealthy people. But the main people in India are beggars.
Fertility restrictions began here in the same way as in the case of China in the middle of the 20th century. Families with two or more children were forbidden to be elected to the local government, to hold leadership positions. The state helped families with only one child, in general, the way to the top and getting any worthwhile work was closed for large families, which again created a vicious circle of poverty in society.
“India has had massive state-sponsored sterilizations of women and has one of the highest rates in the world. In 2011-2014 alone, about 8.6 million women and 200 thousand men underwent surgery (since male sterilization is considered culturally unacceptable in these places), and other methods of contraception for uneducated women living in remote and poor communities are considered more expensive by the government than mass surgical sterilization campaigns.
In some cases, women receive a lump sum payment of 1,400 rupees after surgery, which may exceed two weeks' income in poor regions. Some of the operations were carried out in inappropriate conditions, without disinfection, without examinations, etc., and led to the deaths of more than 700 women in 2009-2012. In 2016, the country's Supreme Court ordered the closure of all sterilization camps over the next 3 years.
The population of India, due to cultural characteristics, can use selective abortion (selective abortion), in which the elimination of women is carried out even before their birth. (Gendercide, Gendercide; a phenomenon similar to female infanticide). The researchers note a change in the ratio of boys and girls born and suggest a steady increase in the number of selective abortions since the 1990s. "
Because of the performed abortions, selective abortions, when women resorted to abortion as pregnant girls, there is a small gap in the country today between the number of men and women: there are 1000 men for 944 women.
In addition to women who died from abortions and sterilization, according to official information, a lot of people died from illegal procedures and were not taken into account by statistics, many were left disabled, the same children lost their mothers.
It is almost honorable to have an abortion in India among the poor population - sometimes a woman can only buy food for her children in this way, because they give money for an abortion.
Of course, the most active and large-scale programs to reduce the birth rate have been and are operating in India and China, and thanks to these countries, we have the most active percentage of world population growth in the world. That is, the world's population is growing precisely at the expense of the poor who have no access to contraception, even more or less worthy human benefits, basic conditions of detention, and sanitation.
Another two countries in which the policy of reduction / control of births was also officially implemented, Iran and Singapore, but in a much less modest framework than in the first two.
Iran
Iran has significantly reduced its birth rate in recent years. The state requires taking courses on contraception before marriage. Since 1993, laws have been in force that have deprived third and subsequent children in the family of social benefits and food stamps. Families of no more than 2 children and the use of contraception are promoted.
Singapore
Headcount control in Singapore went through two phases. After the Second World War, measures were taken to reduce the birth rate. Since the 1980s, after the birth rate fell below the replacement level, the state has been promoting an increase in the number of children in the family. ”
Africa
It is also worth talking about another populous country - Africa (more precisely, the mainland). The population according to 2013 data is 1.1 billion people, that is, at the moment the population is practically on a par with India and China.
Africa in its space has several states, countries, localities where people are simply teeming in poverty, the word "live" - it can not even be called.
Africa has a special place on the list of countries for birth control, mainly because almost no measures are taken to control and reduce the birth rate in Africa, and therefore a catastrophically growing population becomes a truly real problem for humanity. That is, to put it correctly, people are not a problem, but problems associated with overpopulation - increasing poverty, lack of drinking water, lack of civilization, work, education, ethnic strife.
“Demographers were wrong in their predictions: there has been no decline in the birth rate in Africa over the past decades, population growth continues on a scale that was not known to mankind. If in 1960 there were 280 million people on the African continent, today it is 1.2 billion, of which one billion are in sub-Saharan Africa. According to UN estimates, in 2050 the continent's population will be 2.5 billion people, and by the end of the century - 4.4 billion. This is more than the entire population of the planet in 1980.
On average, there are 5.6 children per woman in Nigeria, 6.4 in Somalia (even during the civil war), and 7.6 in Niger. There are many reasons: thanks to modern medicine, infant mortality has dropped, but Africans are in no hurry to limit the number of children. Women are still viewed as 'delivery machines', Africans practically do not use contraception, family planning does not exist. "
Can you imagine that it is not far off when there will be 4.5 billion Africans ??
Together with the Chinese, the Indians, by that time "multiplied" to lawlessness - this is just a crowd of half the planet. But the danger is not at all that the population is growing, but that it is growing in socially disadvantaged areas, where young people see nothing but poverty, ignorance, and often deviant behavior. That is, it is a potentially criminal mass of people….
Already making up the bulk of the world's population.
Poor countries - a colossal potential for powers that have power, because people are, in the mass, a force, productive, working ... or just a platform for experiments, for making revolutions, because the crowd is easy to provoke.
Gates uses Africans for vaccine experiments, operations under various types of anesthesia and without anesthesia at all ...
Here, no matter how hard you try to convince yourself that a person is doing the environment, and not the environment of a person, the second part of this statement will always be right.
I cited Africa as an example that the complete absence of birth control is not good.
Why do we need to practice birth control at all?
In your opinion, is the practice of birth control necessary? Many will say that cruel measures such as sterilization, late abortions, discrimination against girls and handicapped children are evil ... However, an increase in the population in poverty will not do anything good. Birth control is definitely needed, but, of course, not by cruel methods.
For example, it is necessary to increase the accessibility of education, especially for women, to make contraception available, and to raise the prestige of marriage.
The nineties were a difficult time, and it is difficult to write about them due to the well-established clichés. One such cliché is the demographic catastrophe of the 90s.
What really happened?
In the early 1990s, deaths rose sharply and life expectancy fell. The fact itself is very regrettable, but in order to judge it, one must see it in a longer historical perspective. Since Brezhnev came to power in the USSR in 1964, a stable unfavorable trend of mortality growth has developed in Russia - on the graph it corresponds to the 1964-1984 trend line marked with red dots. This trend was disrupted with the arrival of Gorbachev and the start of the anti-alcohol campaign, the number of deaths dropped sharply. When the anti-alcohol campaign came to naught, there was a natural compensatory rise in mortality, which already in 1994 was replaced by its decline. The default of 1998 again led to an increase in mortality, which lasted until 2003, but we can say that all this time the indicators fluctuated around the trend set in the Soviet era, and only after 2003 Russia left this trajectory.
(Figure 1. Actual number of deaths in Russia in 1964-2012 (green line) and trend line 1964-1984)
The absolute number of deaths is an illustrative indicator, but not very correct, since it depends on the age structure and population size, and both are changing all the time. But a correct indicator that does not depend on either the size or the structure of the population - life expectancy - paints roughly the same picture: fluctuations around the "Soviet" trajectory, and the "Yeltsin's" loss is less than the "Gorbachev's" gain (Fig. 2).
(Figure 2. Life expectancy in Russia in 1964-2012 (blue line) and trend line 1964-1984)
Nobody denies the increase in mortality in the early 90s. But if this short-term (it ended already in 1994) burst is called a catastrophe, then how can one call the persistent 20-year degradation of 1964-1984? In addition, one more important detail must be taken into account. The total number of deaths largely depends on the number of elderly people - 60 years and older. Since the late 1980s, representatives of the first non-combatant generations born in the late 1920s began to join this age group. There were much more of them than representatives of the earlier generations, a huge part of whom died on the fields of war and, therefore, did not live to their old age. So the number of deaths in the 90s should have increased for this reason as well.
Now let's turn to fertility. The number of births in Russia fell sharply after 1987, largely programmed by the fall in the number of births in the 1960s. This was the second wave of the "echo of war". In the 60s, children of generations of war years of birth were born, they were few in number. In the 90s, when they themselves became parents, few children swarmed with them (Fig. 3). The 90s themselves have nothing to do with it. But in addition, a restructuring of the age model of fertility contributed to the decline in the number of births in the 1990s.
(Figure 3. Number of births in Russia in 1960-2013)
The fall in the number of births in Russia reached its bottom in 1999, after which an increase began (which is also seen in Fig. 3). This growth is provided mainly by three age groups of women: 25-29 years old, 30-34 years old, 35-39 years old. In 2013, they gave birth to almost 70% of all children born in Russia. How did fertility behave in these key age groups in the 1990s?
At first, the birth rate in them fell, the decline began after 1987, but in 1993 it had already ended, after which weak signs of growth appeared, and since the late 90s, growth has accelerated and continues to this day, defining positive trends in recent years (Fig. 4) ...
(Figure 4. Age-specific fertility rates in Russia in 1958-2013)
True, there is one more important - once the most important - age group of women: 20-24 years. The decline in the birth rate in this group largely predetermined the decline in the number of births in the 90s. In contrast to the older groups, where the recession stopped in 1993, in this group the recession continued until the mid-2000s and has not been replaced by growth until now. But already in 2000, the negative impact of this recession was neutralized by an increase in the birth rate at other ages, and the number of births in the country began to increase. In 2008, women aged 20-24 gave way to the main group giving birth to women aged 25-29.
If we consider the whole picture as a whole, we see that in the 90s, and in the “noughties” the restructuring of the age model of fertility began and continued, expressed in a shift in births to later maternal ages. This restructuring has a deep social meaning, it reflects a different, than before, strategy of people planning their own life, better corresponding to the new conditions of their demographic existence. It is spontaneously chosen by millions of people in all countries. In Europe, this happened back in the 60s - 70s, and the fact that this did not happen then in Russia is explained, I think, by the social stagnation of 1964-1984. When the situation changed, Russian women followed the same path as European women. The fact that they began to plan their lives more consciously is indirectly confirmed by an important achievement of the 90s - a sharp decrease in the number of abortions - which could not be achieved in Soviet times (Fig. 5). It has clearly manifested itself from the very beginning of the 90s and continues now.
(Figure 5. Decrease in the number of abortions in Russia)
The decline in the number of births and the increase in the number of deaths in the early 90s led to the fact that the number of deaths increased more than the number of births, and the natural population growth for the first time in the post-war years was replaced by its natural decline (the “Russian cross” appeared). Natural population decline is an extremely undesirable thing, but there is no reason to attribute it to the "catastrophe" of the 90s. The population of Russia has not reproduced itself since the mid-1960s and has grown only due to the “demographic inertia” accumulated in the age structure. The appearance of natural loss was inevitable and was predicted by official Soviet forecasts. True, it was not expected in the 90s, but in the first decade of the new century. Perhaps the socio-economic crisis of the early 90s has brought the appearance of natural decline a little closer, but nothing more. Due to the structural features of the Russian population in the "zero" years, natural population decline decreased, gradually came to naught, and even a slight natural increase appeared. But this is most likely a temporary phenomenon, it will be very difficult to get rid of the natural decline in the population of Russia - its solid long-term perspective was laid not in the 90s, but much earlier.
The decline in total fertility accelerated in 2017
In contrast to the total fertility rate, a more adequate integral characteristic of fertility is the total fertility rate, which makes it possible to eliminate the influence of the age structure, although it is itself subject to the influence of changes in the calendar of births (“rejuvenation” or “aging” of fertility, a decrease or increase in the average age of the mother at birth. children of different order).
The lowest value of the total fertility rate in Russia was noted in 1999 - 1.157 (Fig. 13). In 2000-2015, its value increased (except for 2005) - up to 1,777 in 2015, which corresponds approximately to the level of the early 1990s and is 15% lower than the level required for simple reproduction (2.1). In 2016, a decrease was outlined - the value of the total fertility rate was 1.762, and in 2017 it accelerated - the value of the coefficient dropped to 1.621, which is 9% than in 2015, and a quarter lower than is necessary for simple reproduction of the population.
Since the mid-1990s, the average age of a mother at childbirth has steadily increased. Previously, the opposite tendency prevailed - the average age of a woman at childbirth declined (except in the 1980s, when the proportion of children of the second and higher birth order increased). By 1994, it had dropped to 24.6 years from 27.8 years in the early 1960s. Since 1995, the average age of a mother has been steadily increasing. In 2016, according to Rosstat, it was 28.4 years, and in 2017, judging by the distribution of births by the age of the mother and the number of women of the corresponding ages, it was up to 28.5 years, which is 3.9 years higher than in 1994, and 0.7 years higher than in the early 1960s. Of course, then, with a higher birth rate, the contribution of births of higher order (second child and children of subsequent orders) to the total number of births was higher, which increased the average age of a woman at childbirth.
A more indicative characteristic of the change in the age of motherhood is the average age of the mother at childbirth. According to S.V. Zakharov's estimates, the average age of a mother at the birth of her first child decreased from 25.1 to 22.3 years in 1956-1992, and then, on the contrary, began to grow, increasing to 25.5 years in 2015. According to Rosstat, in 2016 it rose to 25.7 years, and in 2017 - to 25.8 years.
Figure 13. Average age of mother at childbirth and total fertility rate in the Russian Federation, 1962-2017
The birth rate among Russian women living in rural areas has exceeded the level of simple reproduction. In 2012, the total birth rate of rural women in Russia increased to 2,215 and continued to increase in the next two years, rising to 2,318 in 2014 (Fig. 14). Then it began to decline again, amounting to 2.111 in 2015, 2.056 in 2016, and 1.923 in 2017. The birth rate of urban women, despite the increase, remains lower. In 2017, the total urban fertility rate fell to 1.527.
The birth rate among rural women grew faster in 2000-2015 than among urban women, as a result of which the differences between them began to grow again. If in 2005, when the differences became minimal for the entire observation period, the total birth rate in the countryside was 31% higher than in the city, then in 2013-2014 it was 46%.
Since the birth rate among the rural population began to decline rapidly already in 2015, and among the urban population, little by little, only from 2016, the differences between them narrowed to an unprecedented level. In 2016, the excess of the total birth rate of the rural population, compared with the urban, was 23%. In 2017, it slightly increased, amounting to 26%, as in 2015.
Figure 14. Total fertility rate in the Russian Federation, 1960-2017 *
* Before 1988 - an estimate based on data for two adjacent years; 2014-2017 - including Crimea
The decline in fertility to extremely low levels in most Russian regions was accompanied by a decrease in regional differentiation in terms of the total fertility rate. Only in a small number of subjects of the federation does its value continue to exceed the level of simple reproduction. In 2017, there were only 4 such regions out of 85: the Republics of Tyva (3.19), Chechnya (2.73), Altai (2.36) and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (2.35). Among other regions, the value of the total fertility rate varied from 1.22 in the Leningrad Region to 2.08 in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (Fig. 15). In the central half of the regions, the value of the indicator in 2017 varied in a narrow range from 1.52 to 1.75, with a median value of 1.61.
A decrease in the total fertility rate in 2017 compared to 2015, when the highest value of the indicator was recorded for the entire period since 1991, was noted in all regions of the federation, with the exception of the Sakhalin Oblast, where it slightly increased (from 2.02 to 2 , 03).
Figure 15. Total fertility rate by regions-constituent entities of the Russian Federation, 2005, 2015 and 2017, children per woman
The change in the main characteristics of fertility is clearly visible if we compare the age-specific fertility rates for different years. The age curves for 1990 and 2000 have a similar shape with a pronounced peak in the 20-24 age group, albeit at different levels due to a sharp decline in fertility at all ages (Fig. 16). By 2010, the fertility curve had taken a completely different shape, with the highest fertility in the 25-29 age group. The birth rate noticeably increased in all age groups 25 years and older, especially significantly - by 32 points per thousand - in the ages from 25 to 34 years, although in relative terms the increase was more significant in the ages of 35 and older (2.5 times) with lower fertility. Fertility under 25 years of age has declined slightly.
The age curve of fertility in 2015 is noticeably higher, since fertility increased in all age groups, except for the youngest (15-19 years old), in which it continued to gradually decline. The peak of fertility in the 25-29 age group has become more pronounced.
In 2016, fertility declined in the under-30s, and continued to rise in the 30s and over. In 2017, the decline covered all age groups, and the fertility curve became more similar to the curve in 2010, but noticeably shifted to the right, towards age groups 30 years and older. Compared to 2015, the birth rate decreased in all age groups under 40 years old, most significantly in the group under 20 years old (by 23%) and in the age group from 20 to 30 years old (10%). At the age of 40 and over, a slight increase persisted, although the birth rate in these groups is extremely low.
Figure 16. Age-specific fertility rates, Russian Federation, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2015-2017, births per 1000 women of the corresponding age
* 2015-2017 - including Crimea
The highest birth rate in recent years has been observed among women aged 25-29 years. For the first time, it exceeded the birth rate in the group of 20-24 years in 2008, and in subsequent years the gap between them only increased, although it narrowed slightly in 2017 (Fig. 17). In 2012, the value of the fertility rate at the age of 25-29 for the first time since 1990 exceeded the level of 100 births per 1000 women (107 ‰ in 2012-2013). In 2015, it rose to 113 ‰, but then began to decline again, dropping to 100 ‰ in 2017.
According to one-year intervals, the highest fertility in 2017 was noted at the age of 25 and 26 years (102 ‰), at the age of 27 and 28 it was slightly lower (about 100 ‰) and even lower at the age of 29 (98 ‰).
Fertility at the age of 20-24, after an almost twofold decline in the second half of the 1980s and in the 2000s, remains relatively stable at about 90 births per 1000 women. The increasing birth rate at the age of 30-34 is gradually approaching this level (84 ‰ in 2016). In 2017, fertility declined in both groups, reaching 81 ‰ at the age of 20-24 and 77 ‰ at the age of 30-34.
Compared to the mid-1990s, the birth rate at the age of 35-39 has almost quadrupled (to 41 ‰ in 2016 and 39% in 2017).
The birth rate under the age of 20 is slowly but steadily declining, dropping to 19 ‰ in 2017. In the 40-44 age group, on the contrary, it gradually increases, but remains insignificant (9 ‰). In the 45-49 age group, there are also signs of an increase in the birth rate, but in general it has practically no effect on the total birth rate, and its level is close to zero.
Figure 17. Age-specific fertility rates, Russian Federation, 1958-2017 * years, births per 1000 women of the corresponding age (by five-year age groups)
* Until 1988 - an estimate based on data for two adjacent years (the second is indicated on the graph); 2014-2017 - including Crimea
Since 2017, Rosstat has been publishing data on the distribution of births by mother's age and birth order. In 2016, most of the second births were born (41.1%) and slightly fewer first-borns (39.7%), which prevailed for a long time. In 2017, their shares were almost equal, amounting to 39% each (Fig. 18). At the same time, the share of children with a higher order of birth increased to 21% against 19% in 2016. These are mainly the third children, whose share rose to 15% against 14% in the previous year.
Firstborns prevail among mothers of younger age groups (86% under the age of 20), with increasing age of the mother, their share decreases (to 14% among mothers of 40-44 years). Among mothers aged 45 and over, the proportion of first-borns is again slightly increasing, which is often associated with attempts to use the last chances of having a child, including with the help of modern reproductive technologies. The share of births to mothers 45 years and older is insignificant, but there are signs of its increase: in 2016 it amounted to 0.1% of the total number of live births, in 2017 - 0.2%.
The main part of births occurs among mothers 25-29 years old (33.5%) and 30-34 years old (28.9%), significantly less among mothers aged 20-24 years (17.8%) and 35-39 years old ( 13.3%).
Since in Russia, due to the undulating deformation of the age structure, the number of generations of different years of birth differs markedly, it is more correct to speak about the contribution of the birth rate of different age groups to the total birth rate. In recent years, the largest contribution to it has been made by the birth rate at the age of 29-29 (about 31% in 2009-2017). The contribution of fertility at the age of 20-24 fell to 25% in 2017, although in 2000 it was 39%. The contribution of fertility at the age of 30-34, on the contrary, increased to 24% (15%), at the age of 35-39 - up to 12% (5%), at the age of 40-44 - almost to 3% (1%) , 45-49 years old - up to 0.2% (0.04 in 2000).
Figure 18. Distribution of live births by mother's age and birth order,
Russian Federation, 2017,%
The characteristics of fertility among women with different levels of education are also of interest. In the statistical bulletin on the natural movement of the population of the Russian Federation for 2012, Rosstat for the first time presented data on the distribution of live births by age and mother's education. Similar data are presented in subsequent bulletins for 2013-2017.
According to these data, the proportion of children born to mothers with higher education is growing. If in 2012 it was 39% (45% for mothers with higher and incomplete higher education) of the total number of mothers whose education level was indicated when registering a child, then in 2016 and 2017 it was already 50% (54%). A little more than a quarter of children are born to mothers with secondary vocational education, but their share has slightly decreased, amounting to 26.6% in 2016 and 2017 against 29.0% in 2012. As a result, the proportion of children born to mothers who received higher or secondary vocational education increased from 68% in 2012 to 77% in 2017.
In 2017, the share of mothers without vocational education accounted for 19.3% of births, including 13.4% for women with a complete secondary education and 5.0% for women with basic general education. In 2012, the share of births to mothers who did not have higher or secondary vocational education exceeded 25%, including among mothers with complete secondary general education - 17.8%, among mothers with basic general education - 6.0%.
The share of mothers whose educational level is unknown has significantly decreased: in 2017 it was 7.9% against 22.5% in 2013 and 26.3% in 2012. The proportion of mothers whose educational level is unknown is higher in the younger and older age groups, and especially in the group for which the age of the mother is also unknown.
If we consider the distribution of births by mother's age depending on the level of education, we can note the most pronounced shift towards older ages in women with higher education (Fig. 19). In this group of women who became mothers in 2017, the age groups 25-29 and 30-34 years old have the highest proportions of births (38% and 36%, respectively), and the age group 20-24 years old has the lowest (8 %).
Among those born to mothers with incomplete higher education, the peak in the distribution, for obvious reasons, is shifted to the age of 20-24 (almost 46% of births). The distribution of births to mothers with lower education is also biased towards younger age groups. Among those born to women who received only basic general education, almost a quarter were born to mothers under the age of 20 (22%), another quarter - at the age of 20-24 (26%).
Figure 19. Distribution of live births by mother's age depending on her education level, Russian Federation, 2017,%
In 2017, for the first time in recent years, the proportion of children born to unmarried women stopped decreasing.
Until the mid-1980s, the proportion of those born out of wedlock barely exceeded 10%, and after 20 years it increased to 30% (in 2005). Similar trends in the growth of out-of-wedlock births were observed during this period or somewhat earlier in many European countries. However, in the second half of the 2000s, the share of unmarried women born to Russian women began to decline and dropped in 2016 to 21.1% (Fig. 22 in the section on marriage and divorce). A similar downward trend in out-of-wedlock births has not been observed in other developed countries. In 2017, the share of children born out of a registered marriage was 21.2%.
The data on the distribution of births out of a registered marriage by mother's age, published by Rosstat for the seventh consecutive year in the statistical bulletin on the natural movement of the population of Russia, make it possible to assess the contribution of such births to total fertility by individual age groups (Fig. 20).
The share of those born out of a registered marriage is highest in the younger age groups (97% for mothers under the age of 15, 48% at the age of 15-19). The lowest share of those born out of a registered marriage is among mothers who gave birth at the age of 25-29 years (17%). With increasing age of the mother, this share increases - from 19% in the age group of 30-34 years to 33% in the group of 45 years and older.
Figure 20. Distribution of births by age and marital status of the mother, 2017, thousand people and% of births in a registered marriage
Births out of a registered marriage reflect two types of reproductive behavior: unplanned births as a result of a low culture of contraception, primarily among young women, and, on the other hand, the planned birth of a child with the deliberate formation of a “maternal” family by women, as a rule, of older reproductive ages.
Among Russian regions, there remains a significant differentiation in the proportion of those born out of a registered marriage, which is largely due to the preservation of the socio-cultural characteristics of the marriage and reproductive behavior of various ethnic groups. So, in 2017, the share of those born out of a registered marriage ranged from 10.5% in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic to 63.3% in the Republic of Tyva (Fig. 21). High values of the indicator - up to 30% and more - are typical for a number of regions of the Far East and Siberia, and in the European part of the country - for the northern regions of the Northwestern Federal District (Nenets Autonomous District, Perm Territory).
Compared to 2016, the proportion of those born out of a registered marriage decreased in 30 out of 85 regions-subjects of the federation, in 9 it remained at the same level. In 46 regions, it increased, but the increase did not generally exceed a percentage point. It was the highest in the Pskov region - by 5 percentage points compared to 2016, but this share of illegitimate births - 23.4% - was also noted in the region in 2015.
Figure 21. The share of those born out of a registered marriage by regions-constituent entities of the Russian Federation in 2015-2016,% of the total number of live births
For a long time it was believed that the decline in fertility is associated with economic difficulties that arise with the appearance of each subsequent child. When we noticed in the 60s that the birth rate was declining, they began to conduct sociological research, using questionnaires to find out the conditions for the existence of families. To the question: “Why don’t you have more children?”, The answers were given:
1) there is not enough salary;
2) the problem with housing conditions;
3) it is difficult to place children in child care institutions;
4) inconvenient operating mode;
5) lack of help from grandparents;
6) ill health of one of the spouses;
7) ill health of existing children;
8) conflicts between spouses.
In general, we thought that if we help solve these problems, then the birth rate will rise. It would seem that everything is clear. But to the question: "under what conditions would you have another child?" - a lot of people, especially those with two children, answered: "under no circumstances."
Gradually, experts began to come to the conclusion that it is impossible to study the decline in fertility only in terms of hindrances. A number of authors (V.A. the concept of “family needs for children”. It consists in the fact that spouses do not want to have an unlimited number of children at all. The human desire for procreation is not biological, but social character, and manifests itself in very different ways at different times and in different conditions.
The theory of the institutional crisis of the family explains why the birth rate globally falls to 55 one or two children, which automatically means depopulation. According to this theory, people were only interested in having many children in the pre-industrial era. In those days, the expression "family - the unit of society" was much more consistent with the real state of affairs than in our era. The family really acted as a miniature model of society.
The family was a production collective (for the families of peasants and artisans, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population). Children from a very early age were involved in family production and were of undeniable economic value to parents.
The family was a school in which children received from their parents all the knowledge and work skills they needed for their future independent life.
The family was a social welfare institution. In those days, there were no pensions. Therefore, the elderly and disabled people who lost their ability to work could only count on help from their children and grandchildren. Those who did not have a family had to beg for alms.
The family was a place of leisure. As a rule, family members were resting and having fun together.
In the family, that is, in marriage, the sexual need and the need for children were satisfied. Extramarital affairs were condemned by public opinion. It was very difficult to hide them from others in rural areas or small towns, especially if these connections were of a long and regular nature.
The presence of children (primarily sons) was a prerequisite for being considered a full-fledged member of society. Childlessness was condemned by public opinion, and married couples without children suffered psychologically from their inferiority.
Children also performed an emotional and psychological function, since the parents experienced joy and a feeling of spiritual comfort from communicating with them 56.
Thus, with all their shortcomings, traditional families mostly coped with their functions: they provided themselves economically, socialized new generations, took care of the older generation and gave birth to as many children as was enough (even with the then very high mortality rate) for physical survival of humanity. At the same time, the population in different historical periods either grew or was relatively stable. Of course, during disasters - wars, crop failures, epidemics, etc. - the population was sharply declining, but subsequently the high birth rate compensated for all these losses. Under normal conditions, that is, in the absence of such cataclysms, there has never been a steady trend towards a decrease in the population due to the excess of mortality over births for a long time - this has become possible only in our era.
With the onset of industrialization, the situation changed dramatically. The family lost its production functions and ceased to be a labor collective. Family members - husband, wife and grown-up children (the use of child labor is especially characteristic of the era of early capitalism) begin to work outside the home. Each of them receives an individual salary, independent of the composition of the family and its presence in general.
Accordingly, there is no need for a sovereign head of the family as the head of family production.
In addition, the complication of the knowledge necessary for socialization and subsequent work activity leads to an extension of the training period. If in a traditional peasant family already 7-year-old children have become good helpers for their parents, then in a modern urban family children go to school until the age of 17-18, and if they then go to institutes and universities, they remain dependents of their parents until 22-23 or more. years. But even after they start working, they do not give their parents their earnings and generally leave the parental family at the first opportunity. Their desire to separate after marriage is especially intensified, and in contrast to the era of primacy and minorat, when the son inheriting real estate remained with his parents, all children are separated and only housing difficulties could prevent this (which is very typical for our country).
So, in the pre-industrial era, the economic component of the need for children played an important role. But if he were the only one, the birth rate today would drop to zero altogether. The economic value of children in modern conditions is expressed not even by zero, but by a negative value, and a considerable one.
The emotional and psychological component of the need for a family and children is that the family and children give a person emotional satisfaction. In a marital relationship, this satisfaction manifests itself in the sexual and psychological spheres. Communication between parents and children brings joy, fills life with meaning.
That is why children do not stop being born even when, from an economic point of view, they no longer bring income to their parents, but, on the contrary, only losses.
A demographic policy that uses only economic levers (benefits and allowances for families with several children, taxes on childlessness) has not yielded lasting results anywhere. Although quite popular "Concept of obstacles to childbirth" widespread, including in scientific circles. It is dominated by the opinion that the birth rate is too low due to the difficult material conditions of life.
Hence, it follows that it is necessary to alleviate these conditions by providing families with a small child or several children, various benefits and allowances, and the birth rate will increase so much that the threat of depopulation will be eliminated. This point of view is based only on everyday logic and considerations of "common sense", but is not supported by statistics. A low birth rate, which does not even provide a simple replacement of generations, is observed in all economically prosperous Western countries. The decline in the birth rate itself is taking place not only in conditions of an economic crisis, as is the case in today's Russia, but also in conditions of economic recovery.
It has been two centuries since demographers became aware of the "feedback paradox." When the birth rate was very high and its artificial limitation in marriage was not practiced, the average number of children born in families of all social groups did not differ much, and the difference between them was mainly associated with differences in the average age at first marriage among women belonging to different social groups. groups. The average number of surviving children also depended on social differences in mortality. The decline in child mortality began earlier among the most educated, cultured and wealthy groups of the population. Therefore, in these groups (earlier than in others), parents gained confidence that all their children would survive and began to practice artificial birth control. The birth rate first declines among the social elite, as well as the intelligentsia, then among the workers, and only last but not least among the peasants. At a time when society as a whole is undergoing a transition from a high to a low birth rate, the effect of the “feedback” mechanism becomes most noticeable. However, after the process of declining fertility spreads to all social groups, and its level no longer provides a simple replacement of generations, this feedback weakens and may disappear altogether. Some authors, resorting to data manipulation, tried to prove that the feedback is replaced by a direct one, and rich families have, on average, more children than poor ones. But even with the appearance of such differences in the average number of children between families belonging to different social groups, these differences remain small and unimportant, since none of these groups is no longer able to reproduce themselves naturally. In such conditions, it does not really matter in which social groups of the population the birth rate is higher and in which it is lower, since in all groups it is still below the line of simple replacement of generations.
In addition to the concept of interference, there is childcentrism concept(its author is the French scientist A. Landry, and the most active supporter in our country is A.G. Vishnevsky). The child becomes the center of the modern family, which implies having one child - this is the concept of childcentrism. Yet, regardless of the different points of view of demographers, one thing can be admitted - the current family does not think about the death of children. If earlier there was a very high probability of the death of young children, now few people take into account that a son or daughter will die before their parents. If the countless media reports of accidents were to point to the family circumstances of the victims and mention the episodes when they were the only children of their parents, many families would understand that one child is too little.
One of the main factors in the decline in the birth rate is the destruction of the traditional institution of marriage as a contract in which the husband is obliged to support the family, and the wife to bear children and run the household. Now sexual and friendly communication is possible without joint housekeeping, obligations, etc. Illegitimate (formally) children in many Western European countries make up from a third to a half of all births, in Russia - almost 30%. Everywhere the illegitimate birth rate is growing, but its growth does not compensate for the decline in the marriage rate - in general, the birth rate is falling.
So the relationship between the problem of declining fertility and the destruction of marriage is very strong. But there is no direct connection between the birth rate and mortality rate in our time. In modern Russia, population decline is determined not so much by high mortality as by low birth rate. The nature of the replacement of generations depends on mortality only when the level of the latter is high in childhood and young ages, and a significant part of each generation does not live up to the average age of parents at the birth of children. In our time, more than 95% of born girls survive to this age. A further decrease in mortality is extremely important for humanitarian and economic reasons, but has little effect on the nature of generational replacement. With a total fertility rate of 1.2-1.3 children, which is observed in today's Russia, the population will decline, even if the average life expectancy reaches 80 years. Therefore, in order to increase the birth rate to a level that ensures at least a simple replacement of generations, it is necessary to influence not only the economic component, but also the social and emotional-psychological components.
conclusions
It should be emphasized that fertility is the most important component of the process of population reproduction. The birth rate is measured by various indicators: general rates, age-specific, special and total fertility rates. The intensity of the population reproduction process is determined by the value of the total fertility rate: a simple, narrowed or extended replacement of generations occurs in the country. The existence of a regime of low fertility for one or two generations turns a young growing population into an old one, whose numbers are declining. Thus, low fertility is a major factor in the aging process of the population.
The reasons for the decline in the birth rate are numerous: they are material, housing, social, medical, etc. The concept of "family needs for children" largely explains the historical transition from high birth rates to low ones.
Center expert, L.I. Kravchenko
Ranking first in the world in terms of area, Russia is rapidly losing its position in the demographic field. If in 1991 the Russian Federation was in 6th place in terms of population, then in 2012 it was 10th, and by 2050 Russia will take 14th place. The decline in the population with such a huge territory creates threats, first of all, to the territorial integrity of the state. The situation is obvious: the country is going through a demographic crisis. But the question remains open: what factors and reasons is it caused and does it affect the entire population or is it selective?
This study is devoted to the analysis of this problem.
The demographic problem in Russia has been discussed for a long time. Since the mid-90s, the population has declined in the country. In 2010, the process of population decline was stopped. According to Rosstat, in 2012 the population of Russia increased for the first time and in the first half of 2013 amounted to 143.3 million people. (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Population of Russia 1990-2013, million hours
The increase in the population with a continuing natural decline was ensured by the migration balance. In 2013, according to Rosstat, Russia for the first time overcame natural population decline. However, the dynamics of the change in natural increase demonstrates the excess of the birth rate over the death rate only in a few federal districts of Russia. The question remains - who was responsible for this "demographic miracle"? Does it have ethnic and confessional roots or is it due to material factors (economic well-being of the regions)?
Until 2009, the North Caucasian Federal District remained the only federal district with a positive birth rate surplus. In 2012, the number of such federal districts increased to four: North Caucasian, Ural, Siberian and Far Eastern. The increase in the Far Eastern Federal District is due to the increase in the increase in the Republic of Sakha (ethnic composition: Yakuts - 49%, Russians - 30%). In the Siberian Federal District, a 44% increase is provided by population growth in the republics of Buryatia, Tyva, Khakassia, Altai, 56% due to regions with a share of the Russian population of 83-88%. In the Urals Federal District, the surplus was achieved mainly due to the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Districts (the share of the Russian population is 63.5% and 59.7%, respectively). (Fig. 2). V In the first half of 2013, the dynamics remained unchanged.
Fig. 2. Dynamics of natural population growth by Federal Districts, in people (according to Rosstat data)
In the next two years, natural population growth is expected in the Volga and Southern Federal Districts. At the moment, the Volga Federal District has a positive balance - in five national republics (Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Mari El, Bashkortostan and Udmurtia), as well as in the Orenburg region (75% of Russians) and the Perm Territory (83% of Russians). In the Southern Federal District, there is a positive balance in Kalmykia and the Astrakhan region (61% of Russians). The increase in the district will be achieved due to the excess of the birth rate over the death rate in the Krasnodar Territory (approximately in 2013) and the Republic of Adygea (approximately in 2014).
The most demographically disadvantaged Central Federal District will begin to show positive dynamics no earlier than 2017.According to data for the first half of 2013, natural population decline persisted in all regions of the Central Region, while Moscow is leading in terms of a positive balance of natural movement of the population.
Table 1. Forecast of natural population growth by federal districts
|
Cent- |
North- |
North Caucasus |
Privolzh- |
Ural |
Siberian |
Far Eastern |
||
|
Year reached |
forecast - 2017 |
forecast - 2015 |
forecast - 2014 |
always gain |
forecast - 2014 |
|||
|
Subjects that will provide positive |
Moscow, Moscow region |
Republic |
Kalmykia and Astra- |
6 res- |
Tatarstan, Mari El, Bashkor- |
Khanty |
Republic of Altai, Buryatia, Tuva, Khakassia, Zabay |
Sakha (Yakutia) |
The current state of natural population growth is characterized by a steady increase in the birth rate and a slower decline in mortality. This is most likely due to the transfer of the increased birth rate a generation earlier (the years of perestroika) to the USSR.
The birth rate increase coefficient, which shows how many times the birth rate has increased by districts, indicates an accelerated growth in the North Caucasus (1.7 times), Ural and Central federal districts. (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. The ratio of the birth rate and mortality rate in 2012 to the rate of birth rate and death rate in 2000
With regard to the growth rate of mortality, a slowdown is observed in all districts, except for the North Caucasus.
In absolute terms, the birth rate in the North Caucasian Federal District is significantly lower than the birth rate in other districts. However, in terms of relative indicators (fertility and mortality per 1000 people), the North Caucasus region demonstrates the best indicators - high fertility and low mortality. On average, the birth rate in this district is higher than the average Russian birth rate by 4.1 units. , in mortality 5 units lower. The most unfavorable region in the field of demography - the Central District - is 1.5 times worse in fertility and 1.7 times worse than in the North Caucasus Federal District in terms of mortality. (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Fertility and mortality rates per 1000 people by federal districts
The fertility-to-mortality ratio in this district has exceeded 2, while in the Urals, Siberian and Far East only in recent years it has been possible to achieve only 1. And although each federal district in dynamics shows an increase in the gap between fertility and mortality, the highest rates are in the North Caucasus region. (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. Birth-to-death ratio by district
In recent years, the top ten leaders in terms of natural population growth have not changed. So, growth in the Republic of Dagestan is ahead of this indicator in all federal districts with positive dynamics (except for the North Caucasus), and growth in the Tyumen region and the Chechen Republic in 2012 is ahead of the positive balance in the Siberian and Far Eastern federal districts.
The largest population decline was noted in a number of regions of the Central Federal District. The absolute leader in this indicator is the Moscow region, while Moscow is among the ten leaders in terms of natural growth. St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region have the same dynamics.
Table 2. Leaders in population growth in 2012
Table 3. Leaders in terms of population decline in 2012
Traditionally, population decline is observed in regions with a predominantly Russian population. This is the most important effect. Among the demographic leaders are the national republics with a low share of the Russian population, as well as the Tyumen region and Moscow, in which the growth was achieved due to immigration and a high standard of living of citizens.
Based on the hypothesis that natural decline directly depends on the share of the Russian population, let us consider the dynamics of the natural movement of the population in 20 regions with a share of the Russian population above 90% and in 9 regions with a share from 1 to 31%.
Regions with the maximum percentage of the Russian people in the ethnic composition show a decreasing natural population decline, but the prospect of achieving an excess of birth rates over mortality in the coming years is unattainable. (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. The balance of natural growth in 20 constituent entities of the Russian Federation with a share of the Russian population of over 90%, in persons
At the same time, in 9 subjects with a share of the Russian population of 0.7% up to 31%, the birth rate significantly exceeds the death rate, with the leaders being the Islamic republics of the North Caucasus. (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7.Balance of natural growth in 9 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, in people
In 2020, 2025 and 2030, the so-called "baby boom" will affect exclusively the national republics. In the Chechen Republic, Ingushetia, Tyva, Dagestan, the Republic of Altai, Yakutia and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, a population explosion will be observed every year.
Table 4. Regions with the highest expected fertility
|
Chechen Republic |
Chechen Republic |
Chechen Republic |
|
The Republic of Ingushetia |
The Republic of Ingushetia |
The Republic of Ingushetia |
|
Tyva Republic |
Tyva Republic |
Tyva Republic |
|
The Republic of Dagestan |
The Republic of Dagestan |
The Republic of Dagestan |
|
Altai Republic |
The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) |
Altai Republic |
|
The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) |
Altai Republic |
The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) |
|
Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
|
|
Nenets Autonomous Okrug |
The Republic of Buryatia |
|
|
Kabardino-Balkar Republic |
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania |
Chukotka Autonomous District |
|
Republic of Kalmykia |
Republic of Kalmykia |
Karachay-Cherkess Republic |
The worst birth rates in these years will be demonstrated by regions with a Russian population. In 2030, another Orthodox people, the Mordovians, will also be far from the baby boom. The top ten regions with the lowest birth rates in 2020-2030 include mainly the regions of the Central Federal District.
Table 5. Regions with the expected lowest fertility
|
Moscow city |
Moscow city |
St. Petersburg |
|
St. Petersburg |
St. Petersburg |
Moscow city |
|
Moscow region |
Leningrad region |
Leningrad region |
|
Tula region |
Moscow region |
Tula region |
|
Murmansk region |
Tula region |
Smolensk region |
|
Leningrad region |
Smolensk region |
Voronezh region |
|
Yaroslavskaya oblast |
Yaroslavskaya oblast |
Moscow region |
|
Ivanovo region |
Murmansk region |
Ryazan Oblast |
|
Kamchatka Krai |
Vladimir region |
The Republic of Mordovia |
|
Magadan Region |
Ivanovo region |
Tambov Region |
Thus, the demographic crisis is mediated by ethnic selectivity. The decline of the Russian population continues and has already led to its decline by more than 8 million people since 1989. Since 2002, the number of ethnic groups professing Islam has increased. The number of Uzbeks doubled, 1.6 times - Tajiks, which is explained by migration flows. The size of the Russian Islamic population has increased, while the peoples living in the North Caucasian Federal District have demonstrated high growth rates. Among the Orthodox peoples, the number of Armenians and Ossetians increased. There was a reduction in such Orthodox ethnic groups like Russians, Udmurts, Mordovians, Chuvashs, Mari. Since 2009, the population of Udmurtia began to grow due to natural growth, in the republics of Mari El and Chuvashia - since 2012, the decline in Mordovia has continued, the number of the Russian population continues to decline due to the natural decline in the population.
Table 6. Ethnic composition of Russia according to census data, million people
|
1989 year |
2002 year |
2010 r. |
|
|
All population |
147,02 |
145,16 |
142,8565 |
|
Russians |
119,87 |
115,87 |
111,0169 |
|
Tatars |
5,52 |
5,56 |
5,310649 |
|
Ukrainians |
4,36 |
2,94 |
1,927988 |
|
Bashkirs |
1,35 |
1,67 |
1,584554 |
|
Chuvash |
1,77 |
1,64 |
1,435872 |
|
Chechens |
1,36 |
1,43136 |
|
|
Armenians |
0,53 |
1,13 |
1,182388 |
Based on the 2010 census data on the share of the Russian population in the population of the subjects, we can speak of a decrease in the Russian population in 2012 by 88,000 people, while the population of other nationalities increased by 108,000 people.
The rapid decline in the share of the Russian population in the national republics creates threats to the national security of the country: the connecting role of the Russian people is lost, regions appear that do not identify themselves with Russia, and the ties between peoples are severed in the spatial field of Russian civilization. The demographic situation in the region is becoming an indicator of separatist sentiments. The most unstable regions in this respect are such regions as Dagestan, Ingushetia, Chechnya, with the share of titular peoples of more than 90%, as well as the Republic of Tyva. These republics also have the lowest share of Russian-speaking people. Potential hotbeds of tension can be those regions in which the share of titular peoples exceeds 50% and due to natural growth this share increases.
Table 7. Regions with the greatest potential threat of nationalist hatred with the Russian people and separatism
|
Subject of the federation |
Share of titular people |
Share of Russians |
Share of those who speak Russian |
|
The Republic of Dagestan |
|||
|
The Republic of Ingushetia |
|||
|
Chechen Republic |
|||
|
Tyva Republic |
|||
|
Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria |
|||
|
Chuvash Republic |
|||
|
Republic of North Ossetia |
|||
|
Republic of Kalmykia |
|||
|
Republic of Tatarstan |
|||
|
Republic of Karachay-Cherkess |
For further analysis, let us introduce the concept of the coefficient of "demographic stability", allowing for cluster analysis.
doo 
, where
N (t ) is the number of people for the corresponding year (census years are selected), P / S is the ratio of the total fertility rate to the total death rate. The introduced coefficient indicates population growth due to the current natural increase and the demographic result of a long previous increase.
The threshold value in the case of a harmonious combination of positive signs of demographic stability (previous growth and current growth) is 2. If the coefficient is less than two, then the conclusion follows that something is wrong. Either earlier or at the current moment. It is from this that the possibility of a semi-quantitative assessment of "stability" follows. The calculation takes into account those peoples that do not have statehood outside of Russia (to exclude the error associated with migration flows). (Fig. 8).
Fig. 8. Coefficients of demographic stability of the peoples of Russia
This figure shows that there is also a confessional attribute "responsible" for demographic success. The coefficient of demographic stability has a pronounced confessional character: for peoples professing Islam it is equal to 3.85; for Buddhists and shamanists - 2.86, for Orthodox peoples - 1.83. The only Orthodox people with a coefficient above 2 are the Ossetians. The peoples of the Islamic area, Buddhist and other beliefs are demographically reviving more actively. For some reason, Orthodoxy is still combined with the worst indicators of demographic development. Probably, the worldview mission of Orthodoxy has not yet become an effective factor influencing the reproductive tradition. The worst indicators are among the Mordovians and Russians, who have not yet reached the level of self-reproduction of the population.
Thus, the problem of the demographic crisis in Russia is mediated not only by ethnicity, but also by the mental factor, in particular, the role and significance of the ideological function of religion. The problem of the revival of Orthodoxy is most acutely reflected in the Russian people. Therefore, indeed, we can talk about an ethno- and confessional-electoral demographic crisis.
In the work "State policy of bringing Russia out of the demographic crisis" a four-factor model is presented that explains the demographic situation in the country. It includes the material factor, the ideological and spiritual state of society, the civilizational identity of the Russian state and the role of state policy in managing demographic processes.
Usually, an excessively exaggerated value of the material factor actually affects only to some extent the results of the natural movement of the population. The emphasis of government demographic policy on maternity capital does not particularly affect demographics and does not explain the observed positive phenomena in the current rise in fertility. The psychological state of the population is more important. Thus, the stress of the 1998 default led to an increase in population decline in 1999, and the 2009 crisis slowed down the decline in population decline.
Improvement in fertility rates depends on the number of people entering childbearing age. The correlation between those born and those who entered childbearing age is greatest when the childbearing age is 30 years, as well as 25 and 29 (the birth rate of one year was compared with the birth rate of a year, equal to the difference between the compared year and the childbearing age). This correlation is consistent with actual data on the distribution of births by mother's age. (Fig. 9).
It follows that the current improvement in the birth rate in Russia is associated with the high birth rate growth in the 1980s. This was a short-lived psychological effect of perestroika. In the future, the birth rate should slow down, since the new generation of people of childbearing age are children of the 90s, when there was a sharp drop in the birth rate. If 25 years are taken as the average childbearing age, then starting from 2013 the growth rate will slow down, but if the childbearing age is 30 years, then over the next five years, an increase in the birth rate can still be expected for some time, but from 2017 it will start to decline steadily. (Fig. 10).
The material factor explains nothing at all in terms of the successful natural movement in national regions where the standard of living is low. Figure 11 shows a slowdown in decline in 2010 as a consequence of the 2009 crisis for subjects with the largest share of the Russian population. (Fig. 11).
Thus, the demographic problem is only to a small extent determined by the material factor; the ideological and spiritual state of society has a significant impact.
The following are manifestations of the decaying ideological and spiritual state of the Russian and other Orthodox peoples:
Value crisis;
Late nuptiality: decline in the number of people who marry between the ages of 18-24 and growth in the range of 25-34 years (Fig. 12);
Divorces. The number of divorces per 1000 people in the regions with the highest population decline is 3.9-4.8, in the republics of the North Caucasus, 0.9 -3;
Sexualization of youth;
Extramarital reproduction;
Family nuclearization;
The problem of lonely people;
Abortion. Since 2000, there has been a trend towards a decrease in the number of abortions, which is largely due to the widespread use of contraceptives. But Russia still has the highest abortion rate in Europe. In absolute terms, the number of abortions in 2012 was 1.06 million (for comparison, in 2000 - 2.13 million);
Alcoholization, drug addiction, substance abuse;
Suicide;
Gender gap and specificity of family relations;
Confessional basis for demographic variability.
The government refuses to notice the fact that low birth rates and high mortality rates in our country are associated primarily with the spiritual state of society. So, in Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 9, 2007 N 1351 "On the approval of the Concept of the demographic policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025" is written, that "the modern demographic situation in the Russian Federation is largely due to the socio-economic processes that took place in the XX century."
The main reasons for the low birth rates are named: “low monetary income of many families, lack of normal living conditions, modern family structure (orientation toward having few children, an increase in the number of single-parent families), hard physical labor of a significant part of working women (about 15 percent), working conditions that do not meet sanitary and hygienic norms, low level of reproductive health, high number of abortions ”. However, if you look at the statistics, you can see that it is in the national republics, especially in the North Caucasus Federal District, that the population with the lowest incomes lives, whose birth rate is not affected by either the income level or the 2009 crisis.
A new problem, aggravating the demographic crisis in the country, is the immigration challenge to national identity. At present, the stabilization of the population in Russia has been achieved due to the migration balance (in 2012, the number of remaining migrants was 294,930).
The first years after the collapse of the USSR were characterized by two flows of migration: the Russian population from the former Soviet republics to Russia and the Russian population from Russia to Europe, the United States and Israel. At the first stage, there was an inflow and outflow of highly qualified personnel (Fig. 13).
A noticeable decrease in the outflow of the population by the end of the 1990s. In the 2000s, the outflow of skilled labor decreases, but there is an increase in labor immigrants from a number of CIS republics. The coincidence of the dynamics of migration inflows of the population from the CIS republics (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the republics of Central Asia) testifies to their labor quality. The exception is migrants from Kazakhstan, who, most likely, are the Russian population or assimilated Kazakhs who moved to Russia not for labor earnings, but for permanent residence. (Fig. 14).
In 2012, 91% of the total migration increase accounted for the CIS countries, of which 50% - these are representatives of the republics professing Islam (Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan), together with Kazakhstan - 63.5%. The influx, on the one hand, of a low-skilled labor force, on the other hand, the increase in representatives of other religious confessions, raises the question of the immigration challenge of national identity.
In the Concept of Demographic Policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025, one of the tasks in the field of demographic policy sounds like "attracting migrants in accordance with the needs of demographic and socio-economic development, taking into account the need for their social adaptation and integration." This means that the current migration situation in the country is a consequence of the implementation of a specific task, which clearly does not correspond to the national security of the country.
Further, the concept states that the measures in the field of migration policy will be: assistance to the voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad; attracting qualified foreign specialists, attracting young people from foreign countries (primarily from the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Estonia) for study and internship in the Russian Federation with the possible provision of advantages in obtaining Russian citizenship upon graduation, creating conditions for the integration of immigrants into Russian society and the development of tolerance in relations between the local population and immigrants from other countries in order to prevent ethnic and confessional conflicts. It was not possible to attract qualified foreign specialists, a small number of compatriots from abroad returned, but instead of the declared attraction of qualified labor, labor migrants went to the country, who were called upon to solve the demographic problem.
As a result, when solving the demographic problem, the instrument of migration policy was used, which in turn only led to visible improvements in the demographic situation and created more serious problems associated with the immigration challenge of Russian identity and the integration of a new ethnic community into the multinational Russian people.
Solving the problems of demographic policy by attracting migrants and raising the standard of living of the population is not effective, since it completely ignores the fact that the modern demographic situation is caused by a spiritual crisis, especially of the Russian people. The crisis, which is already obvious, is of an ethno-selective nature, but this fact is hushed up, or not noticed, in any case, there is no adequate state political reaction to it.
Table 8. Peoples of Russia. Ranking by population (highest to lowest)
Note:
* Data on fertility, mortality and natural increase are estimated or not available.
** Peoples of the Republic of Dagestan
Color designation (column peoples) according to confessional characteristics.
Table 8 presents data on the demographic state of the peoples of Russia with a population of more than 100,000 people in 2010. Based on these data, the following conclusions can be drawn.
In general, such peoples as Chechens, Armenians, Avars, Ossetians, Dargins, Buryats, Yakuts, Kumyks, Ingush, Lezgins, Tuvinians, Karachais, Kalmyks, Laks, Cossacks, Tabasaran, Uzbeks, Tajiks do not need additional measures to stimulate the birth rate. , Balkars. Their number and share in the country's population has increased, the birth rate is above the national average, the mortality rate is below the national average, the number of births exceeds the number of deaths. These peoples have preserved their spiritual identity, did not accept the destructive values of the consumer society, and demonstrate a high potential for further demographic growth.
An effective state policy of stimulating the birth rate is carried out in relation to the Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvashes, Udmurts, Kabardians and Komi. Although their number and share in the country's population decreased, the peoples were able to achieve natural growth, the potential for their further demographic recovery is high birth rate and low mortality. These peoples demonstrate solidarity, national self-identification, which is largely due to the presence of their own state formation within Russia. They also largely preserved traditional moral and spiritual values.
It is necessary to take additional measures to stimulate the birth rate for Russians, Mordovians and Adyghe. An analysis of the situation of the Russian people speaks of the electoral policy of reducing its number: this is the only people in Russia that does not have its own statehood - it is the Russian statehood, the birth rate remains below the average for Russia, the death rates are above average, the size and proportion of the population continues to decline steadily. The borrowed values of the consumer society, decomposing the spiritual basis of the Russian people, the lack of cohesion, uniting national ideas and feelings of pride in their country lead to the loss of primordial spiritual guidelines, which finds its physical expression in the natural decline of the Russian population and its reduction.
But it is the Russian people that is the bond of all Russian peoples, Orthodoxy is the spiritual base that can unite different confessions on the principle of peaceful coexistence and harmonious development. Awareness of the described threat and adequate government policy are required.World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision // United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013
There are listed the peoples, the number of which, as of 2002, exceeded 100,000 people, and which did not have statehood outside the Russian Federation.
State policy of bringing Russia out of the demographic crisis / Monograph. V.I. Yakunin, S.S. Sulakshin, V.E. Baghdasaryan and others. Edited by S.S. Sulakshina. 2nd ed. - M .: CJSC Economics Publishing House≫, Scientific Expert, 2007. - 888 p.